The climate movement, inherently effervescent, wonders if “money makes the monkey dance,” because this year has come to a standstill on the eve of one of the most critical moments of the climate change negotiations: the definition of the New Collective and Quantifiable Goal of Climate Financing (NCQG) at the 29th Conference of the Parties to climate change in Baku, Azerbaijan (COP29).
Something is happening within the global climate movement. A worrying trend that I had never seen in my career in the world of international political advocacy.
For years, the chants of young people have echoed through the corridors of United Nations climate change conferences, a myriad of campaigns flood the internet each year addressing the most important topics of the moment, and the relentless coordination of civil society organizations has turned the most inevitable failures into successes of international politics.
Today, something has broken.
“the relentless coordination of civil society organizations has turned the most inevitable failures into successes of international politics. Today, something has broken”
Throughout the decades, an unmet demand has marked the discourse of civil society organizations, and it is rather logical that this is the case: finance for developing countries. I will not delve into the reasons for this demand, founded on the right to climate change, and the flagship of southern countries: the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capacities, but to understand what is happening, I must take a historical review.
In 2009, in Copenhagen, the parties to the Framework Convention on Climate Change reached an agreement: by 2020, developed countries would mobilize $100 billion annually to finance climate action in developing countries. In 2015, with the signing of the Paris Agreement, the deadline for this financing objective was extended to 2025.
Today, the time has come to redefine the financing goal, to scale it up. Successive dialogues on climate financing (TEDs) have concluded that the transition requires a mobilization of resources in the trillions of dollars, and that is the goal to be achieved; this year, at COP29, the New Collective and Quantifiable Goal of climate financing will be defined.
“Today, the time has come to redefine the financing goal, to scale it up. Successive expert dialogues on climate financing have concluded that the transition requires a mobilization of resources in the trillions of dollars”
However, meeting after meeting, I hear the same thing: , and even technical experts describe COP29 as an irrelevant event: “Nothing significant will happen this year,” “let’s focus our energies on planning COP30.”
Why would top professionals, activists who have dedicated years of their lives to demanding more financing for climate action, or politicians and businessmen who would directly benefit from an increase in financial flows for climate action give up on their fight just when they are on the brink of victory?
While this is not a transparent issue, it is clear that it is not a casual lack of interest and I have identified three factors that explain, at least in part, this curious phenomenon.
It is interesting to note a stark contrast between the puzzling inactivity surrounding COP29 and the feverish excitement that pervades the climate community almost in its entirety: COP30 in Belém Do Pará, Brazil.
The first factor influencing the lack of interest in COP29 and the NCQG is the specific weight: Lula aims to position Brazil as one of the major players in international politics, immortalizing his stance in the famous phrase “Brazil is back.”
In the climate world, his return was an earthquake; we went from a denialist president committed unbreakably to deforestation in the Amazon rainforest to one whose first determination at COP27 in 2022 was to announce a Conference of the Parties in the Amazon just two years later.
The signals sent by Lula generated an expectation rarely seen in international spaces, with organizations planning their actions for COP30 two years before it happens.
Meanwhile, Azerbaijan, an inaccessible petrostate with low weight in international politics, which less than a year ago launched an expansionist attack on neighboring Armenia (not to mention the signing of a prisoner exchange agreement during COP28 that secured Armenia’s approval for the Azerbaijani COP) appointed a former oil executive as president of COP29, making him the second oil executive to preside over COP in two years. Expectations regarding the success of the conference are low, and the weariness of civil society and party states of the UNFCCC, high.
The second, even more significant factor than the previous one, is that of thematic competition: not only do the NCQG and COP29 have to compete with COP30, but also with a storm of historical events, geopolitical occurrences, wars, and modifications to international regimes.
“not only do the NCQG and COP29 have to compete with COP30, but also with a storm of historical events, geopolitical occurrences, wars, and modifications to international regimes.”
The escalation of armed conflict in the Middle East, the turmoil in the Sahel and its links to the war in Ukraine, the upcoming COP on Biodiversity in Colombia, which has captivated environmentalists around the world, the crisis and reform of the global financial system, which shifts the focus of the discussion on the purposes and direction of global financial flows, all accompanied by a general climate of uncertainty, have only buried the discussion on climate financing under the rubble of the storm.
Thirdly, there is the issue of power. It is no coincidence that the issue of climate financing is shrouded in silence. In the international arena, power relations are sometimes veiled, but other times, they are explicitly manifested. As I mentioned before, due to the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities it is the developed countries that must finance developing countries for their disproportionate participation in causing the climate crisis, but there is a problem: no one is willing to do such a thing.
The latest negotiations found a block of indolent developed countries; with no proposals and almost disinterested, a block of developing countries disorganized, with internal rifts and little ambition, and scarce civil society campaigns for increased ambition of the NCQG. It sounds cliché, but if we are not discussing financing, it is, at least in part, because those who manage the negotiations, set agendas, and control the funds being debated are
